The continuation of activities and striking government forces in many areas gave strength and increasing momentum to the ranks of the Peshmerga Forces and the guerrilla revolution. On December 6, 1986, a Peshmerga force led by Shimal Zebari, responsible for the Sheikhan local committee, decided to set up an ambush in the area located between Swartuka and Zawita, after receiving information about an Iraqi Army force consisting of two armored vehicles and two military vehicles of the IFA type patrolling between Swartuka and Zawita early in the morning to inspect and guard the road.

But their main goal was to prevent the movement of the Peshmerga in the area [1] It is worth noting that part of the fighting and activities carried out by the Kurdistan Peshmerga Forces consisted of setting up ambushes that could cause significant damage to government military forces [2].

The Peshmerga forces tasked with carrying out this operation consisted of (50) Peshmerga who prepared and developed the following plans:

- A group consisting of (10) Peshmerga elements hid at the bottom of the road until the government military forces approached them so they could fire at them.

- Another group of them carrying heavy weapons such as machine guns and PKCs was monitoring the Situation at the top of the road. If the first group of Peshmerga performed its duty, it would defend the Peshmerga forces at the scene, fire at the soldiers nearby in the area, and also prevent them if they rushed to rescue their defeated forces from Duhok and Sarsink [3].

The entire Peshmerga force moved at night until it reached a place near the location of the activity, then the group of Peshmerga that was scheduled to hide under the road headed to its designated place and set up an ambush, and the second group was 300-400 meters away from the first group where they deployed in the designated place.

With the early hours of dawn, the Peshmerga forces were waiting for the arrival of the military forces, but they were late, and the Peshmerga forces were somewhat worried about their absence, but they suspected that they had been informed and their plans had been revealed. Therefore, they decided to target and fire at any military vehicle passing on the road. When it reached seven o'clock in the morning, suddenly an IFA-type vehicle loaded with soldiers came from Sarsink to Duhok, and as soon as the military vehicle reached them, they came out from both sides of the road and fired RPG shells and Kalashnikovs and destroyed the vehicle. All the passengers were killed except for one soldier who had survived and was captured, and the Peshmerga searched among the dead soldiers and collected their weapons, which were Kalashnikov rifles.

At that moment, a military force from Duhok and another force from Sarsink arrived to rescue their soldiers, and the Peshmerga and the soldiers confronted each other and the fighting intensified. The army's tanks and armored vehicles tried to reach the destroyed vehicle, but they were unable to do so because of the strong defense of the Peshmerga, and the fighting continued until noon, and the Peshmerga forces gathered and decided to withdraw.

The Iraqi regime was very annoyed and worried about the activities of the Peshmerga, because the Peshmerga forces attack their forces whenever and wherever they want and cause them heavy damage, and in retaliation for that, the army bombed the Mizuri area [4].

Sources:
  1.  Masoud Barzani: Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Four, 1975-1990 Gulan Revolution, Part Two, First Edition, Roxana Press, 2021.
  2. Shimal Zebari: Some Hidden Truths in the Gulan Revolution, First Edition, Rojhalat Press, Erbil – 2015.
  3. Swartukahttps:// 3arf.org/wiki/

[1] Shimal Zebari: Some Hidden Truths in the Gulan Revolution, First Edition, Rojhalat Press, Erbil – 2015, p. 352.

[2] Masoud Barzani: Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Four, 1975- 1990 Gulan Revolution, Part Two, First Edition, Roxana Press, 2021, p. 62.

[3] Shimal Zebari: Same source, p. 352.

[4] Shimal Zebari: Same source, p. 354