The continuation of activities and striking government forces in various areas gave momentum and intensity to the ranks of the Peshmerga and guerrilla warfare. On December 6, 1986 a Peshmerga force led by Shimal Zebari, the person responsible for the Sheikhan District Committee, decided to set up an ambush between Swaretuka and Zawita, after they received information that an Iraqi Army force consisting of two armored vehicles and two other military vehicles of the IFA type, along with a military force, would be traveling early in the morning between Swaretuka and Zawita for the purpose of inspection and guarding the road, but in reality, their purpose was to prevent the movement of the Peshmerga in the area([1]). It is worth noting that part of the battles and activities of the Kurdistan Peshmerga Forces consisted of setting up ambushes, through which they could inflict heavy losses on the government's military forces([2]).   

The Peshmerga force assigned to carry out this activity consisted of 50 Peshmerga who prepared themselves and drew up their map and plan as follows:

A group consisting of 10 Peshmerga hid in the culvert below the road until the government's military force approached them and reached them, at which point they immediately engaged them and opened fire on them.

Another group with heavy weapons such as DShK and BKC monitored the situation from the upper part of the road. If the first group of Peshmerga carried out their task, they would defend the Peshmerga force at the scene of the incident, target the nearby military posts in the area and fire at them, and also prevent those forces if they came from Duhok and Sarsing to help their stricken force([3]).

All the Peshmerga forces set off at night until they reached near the location of the activity. Then, the Peshmerga group that had been planned to hide went to their designated location in the culvert under the road and set up an ambush. Their second group was stationed at their designated location at a distance of (300–400) meters from the first group.

When the horizon became bright, the Peshmerga were waiting for the military force to arrive, but they were late. The Peshmerga force was somewhat worried about their non-arrival, and even suspected that they had been reported and their plan had been exposed, so they decided that any military vehicle that passed on the road should be targeted and fired upon. When it was 7:00 AM, suddenly an IFA full of soldiers came from Sarsing to Duhok. As soon as the military vehicle reached them, they came out from both doors of the culvert and showered it with a barrage of bullets with (R.P.G) and Kalashnikovs and destroyed it. All the soldiers inside were killed, except for one soldier who survived and was taken prisoner. The Peshmerga went to the killed soldiers and collected their weapons, which were of the Kalashnikov type.

At that moment, a military force from Duhok and another force from Sarsing arrived at the scene of the battle to help their soldiers. The Peshmerga and the soldiers confronted each other and the battle intensified. The army's tanks and armored vehicles tried to reach the military IFA but could not because of the strong resistance of the Peshmerga. The battle continued until near noon, then the Peshmerga reached each other and decided to withdraw. The Iraqi regime was very sad and worried about this activity of the Peshmerga because the Peshmerga would attack their forces whenever they wanted and wherever they were, causing them heavy losses. Therefore, the Iraqi Army shelled the Mizuri region in retaliation([4]).         

Sources:
  1.  Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Four, 1975-1990 Gulan Revolution, Part Two, First Edition, Roxana Printing House, 2021.
  2. Shimal Zebari, Some Hidden Truths in the Gulan Revolution, First Edition, Rojhalat Printing House, Erbil – 2015.
  3. Swaretukahttps:// 3arf.org/wiki/

[1]- Shimal Zebari, Some Hidden Truths in the Gulan Revolution, First Edition, Rojhalat Printing House, Erbil – 2015, p. 352.

[2] - Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Four, 1975- 1990 Gulan Revolution, Part Two, First Edition, Roxana Printing House, 2021, p. 62.

[3]- Shimal Zebari, same source, p. 352.

[4] - Shimal Zebari, same source, p. 354