This epic took place in the Erbil plain between the Iraqi Army and the Peshmerga forces at the end of the autumn of the Year 1965. The Iraqi Army attacked the bases and headquarters of the Peshmerga in order to reduce the threats of the Peshmerga to the Kirkuk oil wells and the descent of Peshmerga groups into cities and towns. However, the aforementioned army suffered a major defeat, sustained heavy human and material losses, and could not achieve its goal.

In the Year 1965, areas of the Kurdish revolution faced many battles and epics by the Iraqi Army, in order to silence the voice of the revolution in all those areas and defeat their activities. But in many of those battles and in the attacks of the Peshmerga against several places, significant victories were achieved. Several areas of Kurdistan fell back under the authority of the revolution, such as the areas of Qaladze, Chwarta, Khoshnaweti, Mount Sefin, Qaradagh, Garmian, Kelir, and Warmawe.

The Erbil plain, or specifically the village of Bestane, was one of the areas that came under the attack of the aforementioned army. Bestane is a small village in the Erbil plain, affiliated with the Qushtapa sub-district, east of the city of Erbil at a distance of about 30 km. Because it was an important area for the revolution and close to Erbil, Pirde (Altun Kupri), Qushtapa, and Taqtaq, the Iraqi Army could easily attack from those places. The Peshmerga forces could also easily send their groups, squads, and ranks from there into those cities and towns, carry out partisan activities, and return to their place.

It is clear that the government intended in this military occasion to push the bases and headquarters of the Peshmerga away from these areas of the Erbil plain, so that the threat to the Kirkuk oil wells would no longer exist on one hand, because the oil wells were often subjected to the attacks of the Peshmerga. On the other hand, it wanted to reduce the activities of the Peshmerga in the city of Erbil, Koya, and other places. For these reasons, the government in the autumn of the Year 1965 began a large and extensive attack, which consisted of the army and mercenary gunmen (jash), with the support of tanks, long-range artillery, and warplanes, on the bases and headquarters of the Peshmerga in Bestane and the plain of Koya and Erbil, which is also called the five-pronged attack.

The attack of the Iraqi Army and mercenary gunmen (jash) started from five directions: A force from Qushtapa towards Bestane, another force from the Derbend of Gome Spane, another force from Taqtaq and the Shiwane sub-district, the fourth force from Erbil towards Daretu and Bestane, and the fifth force from the village of Qashqa towards Bestane, as well as from Koya towards Degele and the village of Little Taleban. This attack covered a large and wide area of the Erbil plain, which continued for a period of one month with continuous attacks by the Iraqi Army on the bases and headquarters of the Peshmerga from several directions in the Erbil plain.

The beginning of the attack started with heavy shelling of the Peshmerga positions. Artillery units had been stationed from Erbil, the Derbend of Gome Spane, and Qashqa. In addition to this, from dawn until evening, the government's air force was bombing the Peshmerga bases, with the aim of capturing all those areas under the control of the Peshmerga in a short time, emptying their positions, and returning that wide plain to the control of the government army forces.

But it seems that the Peshmerga forces had been informed before the start of the attack that a large-scale attack on their positions in that region was being planned. Because of this, they had made all the defensive preparations to confront the large force of the Iraqi Army. One of these preparations was the transfer of all wounded or sick Peshmerga and those who could not fight to other areas of the revolution that were not at risk of a government attack, so that they would not become a burden on the Peshmerga during the war, or in an unwanted situation, especially in a situation of defeat, they would not fall into the hands of the enemy.

In this battle, nearly 200 Peshmerga experts in fighting and defense sacrificed themselves and strengthened the defensive positions. Also, they repeated the promise of life and death together and with the Kurdish land and beliefs. Under the command of Faris Bawe, Ahmed Haji Ali, Qadir Aziz Wiso Dizeyi, and Seyid Kake, at the beginning of the war, the Peshmerga resisted the Iraqi Army forces and the gangs in such a way that in a period of one month, attack after attack, they did not allow the Iraqi Army to reach their bases, headquarters, and positions. This caused the shock of the Iraqi Army forces, which, with all those military and logistical capabilities and weapons and ammunition that were in their hands, could not achieve what was their goal and for which they had planned.

After a month of attacks and assaults on the Peshmerga positions, the Iraqi Army could not achieve its goal and win over the Peshmerga. For this reason, after great damage and losses that consisted of the killing of dozens of soldiers and the destruction of many military vehicles, they were forced to withdraw their forces to the place from which they had come and began to move and left the region.

After the end of the Iraqi Army's attack, there were also human losses among the Peshmerga forces, which consisted of the martyrdom of 6 Peshmerga and the wounding of 14 Peshmerga. Also, more than 20 villages were burned by mercenary gunmen (jash) and nearly 50 citizens, including women and children, were martyred and wounded by the bombing and shelling of planes. But this did not cause the morale of the Peshmerga to drop to give up partisan activities. This was that in a short time, several Peshmerga groups reached the city of Erbil and attacked several military institutions of the government, in order to show the government on one hand that the morale of the Peshmerga has not dropped and they are continuing in partisan activities, and on the other hand, to reassure the people of the city of Erbil and for it to be clear and obvious to them that these government attacks do not have a negative impact on the strength and morale of the Peshmerga.

Source:

1. Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume III, Part I, September Revolution 1961-1975, First Edition 2004.

2. Ari Karim, Several living pages in September Revolution in,, Xebat Printing House, Duhok 1999.

3. Xorshid Shere, Struggle and Blood, Memoirs of the Years of Peshmerga Struggle, Third Edition, Erbil, 2015.

4. Ibrahim Jalal, South Kurdistan and the September Revolution, Construction and Destruction, 1961-1975, Fourth Edition, 2021.

5. Seyid Kake, Memoirs of a Peshmerga, Ministry of Culture Press, 1st edition, 1997.

6. Abdulrahman Malazade: The Manner of the Formation of the September Revolution, Second Edition, Duhok.