Causes

After the revolution of July 14, 1958, major changes occurred in the political and social situation of Iraq, which were in the interest of all the peoples of Iraq. Among the most important achievements of the revolution for the Kurd was the establishment of Article 3 of the Constitution, which stated (Kurds and Arabs are partners in Iraq, and their national rights are recognized by the Constitution within the framework of a unified Iraq). In terms of freedom of political and organizational work, after the return of the Party leader, after 12 years of exile, the Kurdistan Democratic Party was granted an official license to operate as the only Kurdish party in Iraq.

The partnership between Kurds and Arabs in Iraq lasted for a short time and the third article of the Constitution was never implemented. The political situation was becoming increasingly tense. The government reneged on the promises it had made to the Kurds, began dismissing Kurdish officers and employees from the army and Kurdish employees from their offices, especially in the Kurdish provinces. Kurdish education in Kurdish areas was stopped, the publication of political and literary books in Kurdistan was banned, and the authorities, to satisfy the feudal lords, turned against the farmers.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party stood against this government policy, especially after the announcement of the interim constitution of Iraq and the establishment of Article 2 of the Constitution, which stated (Iraq is part of the Arab nation). Regarding this issue and the situation in general, the Khabat newspaper published an article on October 19, 1960. In the article, along with presenting Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, it called for an end to martial law and the transitional period (Al-Fatrah al-Intiqaliyah), holding free and democratic elections, releasing political prisoners, and stopping the pursuit of members of political parties and trade union and peasant organizations. In response, the government closed the Khabat newspaper and put its editor-in-chief on trial, especially after the issuance of issue 462 on March 28, 1961, which published an article on the occasion of the Newroz holiday, in which it extensively praised the leader Mustafa Barzani and launched a harsh attack on government officials. Later, the government began arresting a number of cadres and members of the Party's Central Committee, and with this, the situation of the Party returned to what it was before the July 14 revolution and it began secret activities and struggle.

Leader Mustafa Barzani at the invitation of the Soviet government to participate in the October celebrations, visited Moscow on November 5, 1960. During the meeting with high-ranking Soviet officials, he asked them to help normalize relations between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Iraqi government. In those same meetings, many of the problems between the Party and the Iraqi Communist Party were resolved.

On January 13, 1961, leader Mustafa Barzani returned to Baghdad and after a period of waiting in February, he met with Abd al-Karim Qasim. In the meeting, leader Mustafa Barzani tried to dispel the doubts and presented all the evidence of Kurdish goodwill towards the government to Abd al-Karim Qasim, but it had no result. It was then that leader Barzani left the capital Baghdad for good at the beginning of March 1961 and returned to Barzan, and with this, the situation between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Iraqi government was getting worse. The government began arming those tribes that had made collaboration their profession. In response, leader Barzani also tried to obtain weapons so that he would be ready for any kind of sudden attack by the government.

At the end of June 1961, the Party's Central Committee met to investigate the situation, and in the meeting, it was decided to give a memorandum to Abd al-Karim Qasim. On July 30, 1961, the memorandum was sent. In the memorandum, it was requested that the conflict and tension between the Party and Abd al-Karim Qasim be ended, that peace be restored to the regions of Kurdistan, and that the deterioration of the situation be prevented. However, Abd al-Karim Qasim did not pay attention to the memorandum of the Party's Central Committee and the situation worsened further. Before sending the memorandum and on July 12, 1961, Jalal Talabani was sent to Barzan by the Party's Central Committee and presented the final decisions of the Central Committee to leader Mustafa Barzani. Talabani showed the readiness of the Political Bureau to face any sudden development. Leader Mustafa Barzani was of the opinion that nothing should be done for now and that they should continue to prepare themselves. Later, Jalal Talabani returned to Sulaymaniyah with some advice from leader Barzani.

The chauvinistic policy of Abd al-Karim Qasim's government towards the Kurdish people continued, and the situation was getting closer to an explosion. In order to prevent war, as a protest against the government's policy, a general strike was organized by the Kurdistan Democratic Party throughout Kurdistan on September 6, 1961. The strike covered all areas of Kurdistan, and this was a demonstration of the weight and power of the Party. The purpose of the strike was to prevent the government from sending forces to the regions of Kurdistan.

Outbreak of the revolution

Despite all the Party's efforts to get closer to the government and prevent war, all efforts were ignored by Abd al-Karim Qasim, and on September 11, 1961, army forces began aerial bombardment of the Bazian pass, the Khalakan valley, and the surroundings of Duhok. In response, on September 19, 1961, the Party's Political Bureau decided to confront the government, and with this, the Kurdish people were once again forced to resort to armed struggle to defend themselves.

After several battles and confrontations, by September 23, 1961, the government was able to take control of all areas of Kurdistan except for a few areas in the Barzan region. On October 6, 1961, both Omar Dababa and Ali Abdullah  The members of the Political Bureau of the Party reached Barzan and met with President Mustafa Barzani In the meeting, the decision for self-reorganization was made, and it was decided to establish coordination between the Barzan force, the Party's armed force, and the armed forces of those tribes that had not yet vacated the battlefield.

After self-reorganization and several victories over the Iraqi army, in February 1962, a broad meeting was held by the members of the Party's Central Committee in the village of Awadilan in Sulaymaniyah Province. In that meeting, the members of the Central Committee sent a memorandum to Abd al-Karim Qasim and announced that the war they were fighting was a war of self-defense and protection, not a war of aggression. Also, in their memorandum, they chose the name Peshmerga for their fighters and raised the slogan (Democracy for Iraq and Autonomy for Kurdistan). Some of the participants in the meeting were Ibrahim Ahmad، Ali Askari , Ahmad Abdullah, Omar Dababa, Ali Abdullah, Mullah Abdullah Ismail، Shamsaddin Mufti, Abdulrahman Zabihy, Nuri Ahmad Taha , and the security detail for this meeting was a 15-person force of Erbil police who had recently become Peshmerga. The meeting decided by majority vote to continue the resistance.

The successes of the Iraqi army were temporary, and in a short time, the Peshmerga forces were able to reorganize themselves and establish the Kurdistan Liberation Army, which consisted of nearly twenty thousand Peshmerga. This force was able to liberate most of the territory of Kurdistan by the middle of Year 1962, except for the centers of the large cities. At the beginning of Year 1963, the government was forced into a ceasefire, which was extended several times until the final fall of Abd al-Karim Qasim's government on February 8, 1963. During that period, the Kurdistan Democratic Party attempted to resolve the problems with the government peacefully, and its efforts were welcomed by the Iraqi public opinion.

The Ba'athist Coup

The September Revolution paved the way for the coup of February 8, 1963, against the government of Abd al-Karim Qasim. This coup was the result of an agreement between the Ba'ath Party and the nationalist officers. During their preparations for the coup, they contacted the Kurdistan Democratic Party and promised to implement all the political and national demands of the Kurdish revolution, and through Salih Yusifi a promise was given to President Mustafa Barzani that after the success of the coup, autonomy would be declared for the Kurdish people. In return, the leadership of the revolution promised to stop the fighting against the government.

After the success of the February 8 coup, a letter was sent by the Ba'ath Party to Ibrahim Ahmad, the Secretary of the Party, requesting that the names of several Kurds be designated to be included in the new government. The Political Bureau, after the approval of President Mustafa Barzani, replied to the Ba'ath Party as follows: (Democracy for Iraq and Autonomy for Kurdistan is the policy of our Party), and our proposed names are: Baba Ali Sheikh Mahmud, Fuad Arif, Bakr Abdulkarim, Omar Mustafa, Jalal Talabani, and Ali Askari.

On February 18, 1963, with the intention of negotiating with the new government, a delegation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party led by Jalal Talabani and Salih Yusifi was sent to Baghdad. The next day, the delegation met with government officials. The Ba'athists tried to evade the promises they had made to the Kurds before the coup. In those same meetings, it was decided that Jalal Talabani, without returning to the President of the Party and the Political Bureau, would visit both the countries of Egypt and Algeria with a government delegation for the purpose of discussing and presenting the Kurdish issue. During that trip, Jalal Talabani met with Gamal Abdel Nasser, the President of Egypt, and Ahmed Ben Bella, the President of Algeria, and both countries supported the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish issue in their discussions.

Revolutionary Command Council

From September 28 to 29, Year 1964, in the town of Qaladiza, with the presence of President Mustafa Barzani and a group of senior cadres of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, military commanders, and social figures belonging to tribes and families, a meeting was held for the purpose of organizing the affairs of the revolution and establishing a constitution and the method of negotiation with Baghdad. President Mustafa Barzani opened the congress with a speech in which he discussed the negotiations and the organization of the ranks of the revolution and requested that a (Revolutionary Command Council in Iraqi Kurdistan) be elected through a free election to carry out the tasks.

At the end of September Year 1964, President Mustafa Barzani and the Political Bureau, based on the decision of the Sixth Congress and the Qaladiza meeting, agreed on setting October 7, 1964, for the establishment of the Command Council for the purpose of managing the liberated areas. Initially, the village of Boskin was designated as the location for the meeting, but later the meeting was moved to the village of Gardaspi in the Pishdar region, and they were in discussions for ten days. 63 people were present at the meeting, including 17 members of the leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, 17 commanders of the forces, 29 religious men from the Islamic, Christian, and Yazidi faiths, as well as social figures, tribal leaders, and family figures.

Previously, the tribal leaders had agreed among themselves on their selection, and they were elected in large numbers; also, the members of the Party leadership and the commanders of the forces were added to the Council. Later, on October 9, 1964, in the village of Boskin, the constitution of the Revolutionary Command Council in Iraqi Kurdistan was signed in 11 articles. On October 10, 1964, the decisions and recommendations of the Judicial Committee of the Kurdistan Province were signed in 13 clauses. Later, the administrative laws and regulations were prepared in 12 articles, and the financial laws and regulations were organized into three parts: revolution finance, taxes, and customs.

By the decision of the Council, an eleven-member executive bureau was formed, of which Mustafa Qaradaghi was the secretary, which was later changed to Mahmud Osman, regarding the level of minorities, the Turkmens did not join this council due to their special situation, although President Mustafa Barzani made great efforts with them in this regard. In order for someone in Europe to represent the council, they appointed council member Dr. Ismet Cheriff Vanly for this task, who had himself participated in the Second People's Congress and the meetings for the establishment of the council. This council established five committees, which were:

  1. Constitution Committee
  2. Judiciary Committee
  3. Military Committee
  4. Administrative Committee
  5. Economic Committee.

Ultimately, at three levels, under the presidency of President Mustafa Barzani, members were elected for these committees, consisting of members of the Central Committee of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, commanders of the September Revolution, tribal leaders, and religious and national figures.

The members of the Central Committee of the Kurdistan Democratic Party were Mustafa Barzani, Habib Mohammed Karim, Dr. Mahmud Osman، Salih Yusifi، Aziz Akrayi, Dr. Fuad Jalal, Abdulkarim Murad, Ali Qasim Shangali، Numan Isa،  Ismail Arif، Hashim Akrayi ، Sheikh Ismail Mullah Aziz، Sheikh Mohammed Harsin, Mustafa Qaradaghi, Mohammed Amin Mohammed Ali, Omar Sharif and Ramazan Akrayi .

The commanders of the September Revolution were Colonel Abdulrahman Qazi, Colonel Nuri Mullah Maruf, Colonel Staff Abdulkafi Nebi, Colonel Sheikh Salih Sheikh Mohammed, Lieutenant Colonel Nafiz Jalal Hawezi, Lieutenant Colonel Nuri Mullah Hakim, Captain Bakr Abdulkarim Hawezi, Captain Yusuf Jamil Miran, Captain Sheikh Reza Gulani , Lieutenant Rashid Sindi, Police Lieutenant Abdulwahab Atrushi , Asaad Khoshawi, Isa Suwar, Hasso Mirhan Dolemeri, Ali Khalil, Abdullah Agha Pishdari and Haji Sheikh Qadir.

Tribal leaders, religious and national figures were Dr. Ismet Cheriff Vanly, Dr. Kamal Fuad, Sheikh Latif Hafid، Kaka Ziad Ghafoori, Muhsin Dizayi, Sheikh Husseini Boskin, Bapir Babakr Agha, Sheikh Mohammed Balisani, Wahab Agha Jundiani, Abbas Mamand Agha, Ismail Swara Agha, Salih Beg Miran, Suleiman Haji Badri Sindi, Ahmed Mohammed Amin Dizayi, Mahmud Beg Gulayi, Mustafa Beg Jaf, Sheikh Kawkasi Sayyid Taha Nehri, Kukhwa Ismail Talani, Haji Agha Hero, Majid Hama Rashid Khan, Mahmud Abbas Agha, Abdulrahman Agha Norak, Sheikh Rauf Hanjira, Haji Ibrahim Charmaga, Sheikh Muhiddin Sandulan, Bishop Mario Walla, Priest Paul Bedari, Gorgis Malik Chako and Tahsin Beg Saeed Beg.

The establishment of the Revolution Leadership Council was an important step in organization and management work. This council, at the highest level, undertook the appointment of district and sub-district administrators, etc., the placement and distribution of ranks and titles for the various leaderships of the revolution's army, the assignment of the Political Bureau for Party work and the election of a secretary for itself, and the formation of the Executive Bureau, which was entrusted with the work of management, implementation of special decisions regarding internal affairs, and supervision of government bodies in the liberated areas. This council was directly managed by President Mustafa Barzani.

The revolution's army was organized as follows:

  • Second Army in Erbil: Rashid Sindi, the forces consisted of:
  • Third Army in Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk: Lieutenant Colonel Aziz Akrayi, the forces consisted of:
Resumption of the war 1965

At the end of the Year 1964 and during the period of the new cabinet of Tahir Yahya, the efforts of the government of Iraq and the Revolutionary Command Council were intensified with the aim of preventing the resumption of war, and for this very purpose, on December 17, 1964, a government delegation visited President Mustafa Barzani and on January 10, 1965, the Revolutionary Command Council sent their own delegation to Baghdad. These efforts continued until March 1965. After the talks stalled, tensions returned to the relations between the two sides, and in February 1965, the war restarted.

In this phase of the war, the government, despite using the vast majority of its military force, benefited from a large number of Jash (pro-government militias). The attacks of the government army and the Jash began in the middle of April 1965 by attacking Mount Safin in Erbil Province. The most important battles of this phase consisted of the Battle of Safin in April 1965, the battles of Piramagrun on April 28, 1965, the battles of Qaradagh on June 4, 1965, the battles of Azmar and Chwarta on June 25, 1965, the Battle of Zinetir in the autumn of 1965, the battles of the Rawanduz front on August 5, 1965, the Battle of Kiwarash on September 6, 1965, the battle to recapture Penjwen on December 23, 1965... etc. As a result of these battles, the Iraq army was able to advance in several places, and in many places, they were repelled by the Peshmerga forces of the revolution and were forced to retreat.

 During that same period and after the pardon of President Mustafa Barzani, on July 6, 1965, the Political Bureau group, under the supervision of Ibrahim Ahmad , returned from Iran to Southern Kurdistan and settled in Haji Omaran. After a while, at the beginning of the Year 1966, the group joined the government and stood against the revolution.

The (Tawakkaltu 'ala Allah) plan, the new phase of the war 1966

After the death of Abdul Salam Arif on April 13, 1966, and the resignation of the cabinet of Tahir Yahya, Abdul Rahman Arif became the President of Iraq, and the new government cabinet was formed by Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz. During that same period, the Political Bureau group defected from the revolution and joined the government. These factors caused the government to feel its superiority; therefore, the Minister of Defense, Staff Brigadier General Abdul Aziz al-Uqaili, drafted a plan to attack the Peshmerga forces of the revolution and named it (Tawakkaltu 'ala Allah). The plan began on May 3, 1966, by the Fourth Mountain Brigade with the Support of the First Brigade against Mount Handren, and the Third Brigade with the Support of the Fourteenth Brigade against Zozk. In this attack, the government used the vast majority of the Jash forces. This attack by the government army resulted in the Epic of Handren on May 12, 1966, which led to the defeat of the government forces and the Jash, the issuance of the statement of June 29, 1966, and the government's agreement to the demands of the revolutionary leadership and a temporary ceasefire. The statement was read by Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz.

The new phase of the revolution and the role of the Jash (1966-1970)

After their failure to implement the (Tawakkaltu 'ala Allah) plan, the government tried this time to implement its plans against the revolution by opening headquarters and giving weapons to the Jash, especially the old Political Bureau group. The Jash performed this task in the worst way and became the guides and executors of the government's plans.

In return, the government tried by sending delegations to Barzani's headquarters and inviting and welcoming the delegations of the revolution in Baghdad to make the people and the outside world understand that their relations with the revolutionary leadership were at the peak of strength. Among the most important visits of that period was the arrival of President Abdul Rahman Arif to Barziwa to see President Mustafa Barzani on October 28, 1966, and later the visit of Idris Barzani and Masoud Barzani one after another to Baghdad in January 1967.

During the ceasefire, the revolutionary leadership, with the aim of strengthening the army of the revolution, held several various military courses for the Peshmerga, and on April 17, 1967, the Kani Samak military conference was held under the supervision of President Mustafa Barzani, and a constitution for carrying out the tasks and duties of the revolution was approved. The government also fulfilled part of the promises it had made in the statement of June 27, especially after the visit of Prime Minister Tahir Yahya to President Mustafa Barzani in August 1967, and returned the villages of the Dibis area, where Arabs had been settled, to their Kurdish owners.

The relations between the revolutionary leadership and the government became tense again when a government delegation visited the revolutionary leadership on October 7, 1967. The delegation announced that the government had reneged on the discussion and had no intention of disarming the Jash, and the Prime Minister, in a letter, informed President Mustafa Barzani that he had no authority in this regard and that the President was under the influence of army officers. This caused the revolutionary leadership to decide to carry out this task itself and send Peshmerga forces against the Jash headquarters in Bakrajo. At that time, by the President, Abdul Karim Farhan, the Minister of Agriculture, was sent to President Mustafa Barzani and asked him to stop the attack. President Barzani agreed to the President's request. In return, the government sent a large number of troops to Sulaymaniyah with the aim of supporting the Jash. After these events, the phenomenon of the assassination of cadres and members of the Kurdistan Democratic Party by the Jash in Erbil and other areas increased. In return, the revolutionary leadership tried to respond by sending armed detachments against the Jash. The Situation became such that Prime Minister Tahir Yahya sent a letter to President Mustafa Barzani and asked him to stop hitting the Jash; in return, he promised him that he would stop the assassination acts by the Jash and close the Bakrajo prison, which was managed by the Jash.

At the beginning of 1968, the Situation between the revolution and the government deteriorated once again. The government attacked the revolution through the Jash (pro-government militias) and, under the pretext of calming the Situation, sent the army to the Sheikhan region. In response, Mustafa Barzani sent a letter requesting the President, the Prime Minister, and the Chief of Staff of the Army to set a border for this Situation, but the government's evasion of the Situation led to the revolutionary forces responding to the attacks of the Jash and the army.

On April 15, 1968, fighting broke out in the Erbil plain between the revolutionary army and the regime's army and the Jash, which continued until April 18. As a result, the Iraq army was defeated and forced to withdraw from the Erbil plain.    

On July 17, 1968, the government of Abdul Rahman Arif was overthrown by a coup d'état by the Ba'athists, and Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr was appointed as President by the Ba'athists. Consequently, until the end of 1968, no significant fighting occurred between the revolutionary army and the army. In contrast, the attacks of the Jash had intensified. The new authority in Iraq adopted a new policy and tried to get closer to the communists and gave more importance to the Jash, especially the Political Bureau group, and cleared the field for them to attack the forces of the revolution. They also tried, with the help of the army, to take control of the Qaradagh areas. In response, the revolutionary leadership sent the Khabat, Rizgari, and Erbil Plain forces to Qaradagh on October 12, 1968, to confront the Jash. These forces were able to clear the area of Jash by the 28th of the month. As a result, the Jash retreated towards the government headquarters in Kirkuk.

In February 1969, the revolutionary leadership decided to attack the Baba Gurgur oil in Kirkuk, which was an important source of government revenue and was being used against the revolution. After preparations, the attack was successfully carried out on March 2, 1969, and the government did not have a significant reaction in return.

  In 1969, from the month of February, the war intensified. The government, with the help of the Jash, attacked the revolutionary forces from every side they could, and throughout that period, several battles took place, the most important of which were:

The Battle of Shakholan on February 21, 1969, the Battle of Alana Valley on July 13, 1969, the Battle of Sharazur and Halabja on May 25, 1969, the Battle of Dukan on September 20, 1969, the Battle of Dakan and Soriya in mid-August 1969. In those battles, many massacres were committed by the army and the Jash, and they spared nothing. The government, with the help of the Jash, had intensified their attacks on the Garmian and Qaradagh areas, and the war continued throughout the three months of summer. As a result, the Peshmerga were forced to retreat and gathered in the Surdash mountain. In contrast, the army did not achieve any significant victory in the Erbil plain. After those victories, the government and the Jash planned not to stop until the Dilman area, where Barzani's headquarters was located, so they resumed their attacks. In mid-October 1969, they launched a multi-faceted attack on the Marga area, and the valleys of the martyrs were occupied.

After the advance of the army and the Jash, at the end of October 1969, the Peshmerga forces reorganized themselves and carried out a counter-attack, and in the epic of Gartk on October 31, 1969, they defeated the army. That defeat of the army led to many other defeats in the battles, such as:

 The Battle of Marga on November 6, 1969, the Battle of Piramagrun on November 18, 1969, the Battle of Surdash Mountain in mid-November 1969, etc. These defeats once again forced the government to enter into negotiations with the revolutionary leadership, and the negotiations resulted in the March 11, 1970 Agreement.    

The March 11, 1970 Agreement

The Ba'athists failed in their military efforts to end the revolution, and during that time, the revolution achieved great success. The Ba'ath government had nothing left but the waste of a large amount of human and material resources, so it thought about an agreement with the Kurds. In September 1969, the first attempt by the Ba'athists to reach an agreement with the revolutionary leadership began through a delegation of the Kurdistan Students Union, and the negotiations continued for several months. Delegations from both sides traveled between Baghdad and Nawprdan at the highest levels for the purpose of reaching an agreement. Finally, after the visit of Saddam Hussein, the Vice President of Iraq, to Nawprdan and his meeting with President Mustafa Barzani On March 11, 1970, an agreement was signed between the Iraqi Ba'ath government and the revolutionary leadership, and the result was the recognition of what the Kurds had started the revolution for, which was the recognition of the political and national rights of the Kurdish people in Southern Kurdistan.

The reversal of the March 11 Agreement and the 1975 Algiers Agreement

The March 11, 1970 Agreement, as it had been agreed upon, was never implemented by the Iraq government, and thus the Situation between the revolutionary leadership and the Iraq government deteriorated. On March 26, 1974, the Ba'ath regime announced the suspension of talks with the revolutionary leadership. Later, it dissolved all border guard battalions, and the war started again between the two sides. The regime's artillery began shelling the areas under the control of the revolution in that month, and by the end of September 1974, it had taken control of most of the areas under the control of the revolution. The army's victories did not last long, and they were forced to retreat by the revolutionary army in the areas they had occupied. During that period, the revolution was widely supported by the Imperial Government of Iran.

At the end of the autumn season of 1974, Baghdad announced the continuation of the war and declared that the war would continue through the winter season. These defeats were unbearable for the Ba'ath regime and Saddam Hussein. The government had become completely weak against the revolution, so it was forced to even use its reserve members, and the government's financial reserves were nearing exhaustion. The Shah of Iran wanted to pressure Iraq through helping the revolution so that it would revisit the May 1937 treaty regarding the (Shatt al-Arab). It was for this purpose that he convinced the United States of America to help the revolution secretly under his supervision.

Mohammad Reza Shah of Iran was getting closer to his goal. On March 6, 1975, the OPEC summit was held in Algiers with the presence of representatives from the thirteen member countries of the organization. At this conference, with the cooperation of the host country's president, Houari Boumédiène, a political-military agreement was signed between Saddam Hussein, the then Vice President of Iraq, and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran. The result of the agreement was that Iran would help Iraq in besieging the Kurdish revolution, protect its borders with Iraq, and no longer interfere in Iraq's internal affairs, in exchange for Iraq relinquishing some land in (Shatt al-Arab) to Iran and returning the water borders of both countries to the 1913 Constantinople Treaty between Iran and the Ottoman Empire.

The Collapse of the Revolution

When the Algiers Agreement was announced, President Mustafa Barzani had sent a delegation to Tehran at the request of the Shah of Iran. On behalf of President Barzani, Muhsin Dizayi was sent from Tehran to Haji Omaran to hold an urgent meeting with the members of the political bureau and the political and military leaders of the revolution and inform them of the latest developments. On the afternoon of March 8, 1975, Muhsin Dizayi arrived in Haji Omaran and organized a meeting. Barzani's envoy announced to the attendees that the Iranian monarchy regime had decided to close the borders from April 1 and was no longer willing to help the revolution. President Barzani had asked the leadership members to decide whether to become refugees in Iran or to continue the revolution.

Most of the political bureau members were in favor of continuing the revolution through guerrilla warfare and not surrendering to any side. Muhsin Dizayi returned to Tehran on March 9 and announced the decisions and proposals of the meeting to President Barzani. The same day, through the wireless device of the Party office in Tehran, the response of President Mustafa Barzani Mustafa Barzani was sent back to Haji Omaran, supporting the Kurdistan Democratic Party leadership's proposal to continue the guerrilla war.

After Mohammad Reza Shah returned from Algiers, he met with the revolution's leadership delegation in Tehran on March 11, 1975. The Shah justified the agreement by saying, (I was forced to put my country's interests before other interests, just as you, out of concern for your own interests, signed the March 11, 1970 agreement with them).

On March 12, President Mustafa Barzani and the accompanying delegation returned to Haji Omaran. The same day, he held a meeting with the party's leadership members. In the meeting, the decision to continue the war was made. On March 13, after the announcement of the ceasefire, a broader meeting was held by President Mustafa Barzani, in which the military leaders of the region, political figures, and senior party cadres participated. It was decided that the revolution's regions would be divided into several sectors and a specific field leader would be appointed for each sector. Also, in order to lighten the burden on the revolution and reduce the number of Peshmerga forces, it was announced that everyone was free to return to Iraq and benefit from the general amnesty, or head to Iran as a refugee, or remain in the areas under the revolution's control and continue fighting. Most of the people who participated in the meeting decided to stay.

After the decision to continue the revolution, on March 18, General Mansour Pour, the representative of Mohammad Reza Shah, came to the area under the revolution's control and met with President Mustafa Barzani and some members of the political bureau. Mansour Pour had brought the Shah's final decision regarding the revolution. He announced to the revolution's leadership (If you continue fighting, then the Iraqi military forces are allowed to enter Iranian territory to destroy the revolution, and the Iranian forces will also help them if necessary). On March 18, the revolution's leadership decided to hold an urgent meeting. In that meeting, which was attended by members of the political bureau and the central committee, President Mustafa Barzani announced his opinion to the attendees, which was to stop the war for a temporary period and restart it at a more favorable time. After discussing the entire situation with the military leaders and party and political figures, they all approved President Barzani's proposal. Thus, by March 25, 1975, the vast majority of the revolution's leadership, Peshmerga, and civilians had become refugees in the country of Iran, and a large number also benefited from the general amnesty and remained in Kurdistan, later being relocated to southern and central Iraq.

Sources:
  1.  Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, 1958-1961, Volume Two, (2012).
  2.  Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement 1961-1975, Volume Three, Part One, (Erbil - Ministry of Education Press - 2004).
  3.  Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement 1961-1975, Volume Three, Part Two, (Erbil - Ministry of Education Press - 2004).
  4.  History of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Congress and Conference (Program and Internal Regulations). Kurdistan Democratic Party Encyclopedia Board, Volume One, (Erbil - Rojhalat Press - 2021).
  5.  Salah al-Kharsan, Political Currents in Iraqi Kurdistan, A Reading in the Files of Kurdish Movements and Parties in Iraq 1946-2001, (Beirut – Al-Balagh Press – 2001 AD).
  6.  Habib Muhammad Karim, History of the Kurdistan Democratic Party - Iraq (In Key Milestones) 1946 – 1993, (Duhok – Khabat Press – 1998 AD).
  7.  Dr. Sherko Fathullah Omar, The Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Kurdish National Liberation Movement 1946 – 1957, trans. Swara Qaladzehi, (Shahid Azad Hawrami Press - 2013).
  8.  Shawkat Malla Ismail Hassan, Days in the History of the Aylul Revolution 1961 – 1975, (Erbil – Tafsir Office for Publishing and Media – Ministry of Education Press – 2007 AD).
  9.  Ismet Cheriff Vanly, Iraqi Kurdistan: A National Identity (A Study of the 1961 Revolution), translated by Suad Muhammad Khader, (Sulaymaniyah – Jiyan Institution – Shvan Press – 2012 AD).
  10.  Shirzad Zakaria Muhammad, The Revolutionary Command Council in Kurdistan - Iraq 1964 – 1970, A General Political Historical Study, (Duhok – Center for Kurdish Studies and Document Preservation – University of Duhok – University of Duhok Press – 2010 AD).
  11.  The Revolutionary Command Council of Tribes was formed, Committee for the Defense of Tribal Rights, Ettela'at Newspaper, No. 11533, Tehran, Saturday, 16 Aban 1343 SH.
  12.  Following the issuance of the Iraqi tribes' declaration regarding autonomy, Ettela'at Newspaper, No. 11534, Tehran, Sunday, 17 Aban 1343 SH.