After the Zawita battle from 5 to 6 of December 1961 in which the Peshmerga achieved a great victory, after being able to inflict great damage on the army and the Jash, this makes the Peshmerga take control of the Sarsing sub-district and the Zawita valley. President Barzani was in the village of Alkishke at that time, and news reached him that the Iraqi Army forces were making many movements and intended a widespread attack with the goal of opening the Sarsing road and re-taking control of the area.

Preparations

On 12 of December 1961, the government forces, which consisted of an armored company (sariya), an infantry company from the 3th Battalion of the 11th Brigade, an artillery battery, a police battalion, the 3th Battalion of the 1st Police Brigade, along with 200 hired Jash, these forces moved from Duhok towards Amedi under the command of Colonel Bashir Ibrahim, commander of the 3th Battalion of the 11th Brigade.

Barzani was directly supervising the war front and, according to a solid military tactic, had distributed his forces over several defensive positions from Merga Drezh to the village of Lomana and from the village of Kevlesne to the village of Bagera-i-Saru. The preparations were in the form of ambushes and guerrilla warfare, and at the same time, they were based on a tactical military plan in which 200 Peshmerga were stationed under the command of Mela Shni Qurtas Bedaruni from Qantara to the top of Swaratuka on both sides of the road. Also, 200 other Peshmerga were stationed under the command of Haso Mirxan Dolemeri between Gari Gavana and Mangesh on both sides of the road. In this way, these two main roads were completely under the authority of the Peshmerga force.

After Barzani was informed of the arrival of that large government force, he ordered the Peshmerga to set an ambush in the curves of Lomana. When the force arrived, it fell into the Peshmerga's ambush, and none of them escaped; they were either killed, wounded, or taken prisoner. All military equipment also fell into the hands of the Peshmerga..

It is worth mentioning that during the fierce confrontation, the weather was in favor of the Peshmerga. It was a cold day, and fog had covered the entire area. The fighter jets were not successful in bombing the Peshmerga positions because, due to the weather, they could not distinguish between the Peshmerga and the soldiers, and also because of their proximity to each other, so they were circling the sky of the area in vain.

Enemy losses and Peshmerga gains

The result of the battle caused great human and material losses for the government, which led to the killing and capture of hundreds of Iraqi Army soldiers, most of whom were in the police ranks. Also, 76 cargo trucks were burned. As for the Peshmerga's gains, a large number of military supplies, including bullets and other necessary military ammunition, were seized, and 1500 pieces of various weapons were captured on the battlefield. Because a number of the sons of the Badinan tribes in Nerwayi, Berwari, Sindi, Doski, and Guli had just joined the ranks of the revolution and become Peshmerga and did not have weapons, these gains made most of them owners of weapons.

The losses of the Kurdistan revolution in that epic were two Peshmerga who lost their lives, named Khidir Karim Khoshnaw and Hassan Goran, and the wounding of 18 other Peshmerga.

It is worth mentioning that a participant in the event points out that this large human loss of the government forces caused concern and sadness for Barzani. He had even said that the soldiers and police are also victims and are the children of that nation; they have come to fight us by the order of the government, so as much as you can, do not kill them, wound them. Therefore, the force of Commander Nabi Sar-Asn, who had blocked their escape route, opened the road for them on Barzani's order so that they could retreat and save themselves from death.

The impact of the success of this epic

The importance of recording this success of the Peshmerga force in the epic of Lomana is that the revolution entered a new phase. It led to the spread of a spirit of self-confidence and the elevation of the Peshmerga's morale for confrontation against a large, well-armed force throughout Kurdistan, including the Soran areas. It was also the first time that the government army suffered such heavy human and material losses. On the other hand, it broke the barrier of treason and collaboration for those people who were within this framework, placing them in a circle of greater disgrace and identifying them to the people of Kurdistan. At the same time, it was a correct response from the Kurdistan revolution to the statement and press Congress of Abdul Karim Qasim on 23 of September 1961, in which he had declared the beginning and end of the Kurdish rebellion.

Another importance of this epic is that an entire mobile brigade was destroyed in it, as we mentioned earlier. The soldiers who were killed, wounded, or captured in that battle were each from a place and city in Iraq. Those who were released or returned wounded spread the news of the Kurdistan revolution throughout Iraq. Thus, the impact of the success appeared to friend and foe in Iraq and Kurdistan that the revolution is honest in the elevation of its slogans, because in addition to releasing the prisoners, who numbered 330 people, after they were released to the village of Kundaka-i-Bni and from there sent to Duhok, the wounded were also released after being treated.

After that battle, the government was forced to ask for negotiations with Mela Mustafa Barzani. Although in reality, the government's desire for dialogue was a plot to bombard the location of the negotiations at the time of the meeting between President Barzani and the commander of the brigade's detachment, 5, Staff Colonel Hassan Abud, so that their lives would end together, but Barzani's intelligence, after consulting with the Peshmerga commanders, changed the meeting place, and thus the government's conspiracy was revealed and exposed to both sides.

Sources:

1- Abdulfattah Ali al-Butani, Badinan Region 1925 – 1970, Vol. 2, Salahaddin University Press, Erbil, 2017, p. 159.

2- Saeed Hamu, Memoirs of an Infantry Brigade Commander, Baghdad, 1977, p. 20.

3- Wasfi Hassan Ridini, The Epic of Lomana – Kevlesne, Khani Press, Duhok, p. 23 – 24.

4- Hawkar Karim Hama Sharif, The September Revolution, Salahaddin University Press, Erbil, 2012, p. 150 – 151.

5- Haji Mirxan Dolemeri, Searching for Justice: Another Side of the History of the Revolution in Kurdistan 1943 – 1991, Volume One, No place of publication, Kurdistan, 2021, p. 224 – 225.

6- Rajab Jamil Habib, Amedi (Al-Amadiyah) 1921 – 1975, Hawar Press, Duhok, 2012, p. 236 – 237.

7- Shawkat Mullah Ismail Hassan, Days in the History of the September Revolution, Second Edition, Tafsir Office, Erbil, 2006, p. 40.