The situation before the operation

After the victory of the Peshmerga Forces in the Zakho Strait battle, Issa Siwar asked Barzani to form a force to strike the Ain Zala oil company. After obtaining approval and discussing all aspects of the operation, preparations began in complete secrecy, and then Asaad Khoshawi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Badinan region, appointed Issa Siwar to lead the military operation.

The region's leaders were interested in gathering information about the Ain Zala site, which is about 15 to 20 kilometers from the mountainous region, and 8 to 10 hours on foot from the nearest Peshmerga site. The Tigris River served as a water barrier for the Peshmerga to cross, which meant the operation had to be carried out in record time so as not to encounter government forces during the withdrawal and to avoid aerial bombardment. Something that facilitated the operation for the Peshmerga, in September 1962, two Kurdish policemen joined the revolution, Hama Sur Hussein Barzinji and Mustafa Faraj Shawani, who were working at the Ain Zala oil company. After discussions with the region's leaders, consultations, information, and exchange of opinions, to participate in the operation, final approval was granted. 

Peshmerga preparations

Before the Peshmerga crossed the Tigris River, Issa Siwar held a meeting with all Peshmerga commanders and officials. In the meeting, the forces were distributed into three groups, and each group was assigned a commander whose mission was as follows: 

The first group: Issa Siwar's force, consisting of Mullah Hamdi Abdul Majeed al-Salafi, Abdul Rahim Jasim, Corporal Darwish, and Hajj Qado Karavi, with the main guide Mustafa Faraj. The mission of this group was to control the main gate of the company.

The second group: Hashim Mirozi's force, which consisted of Ali Saif al-Din, Murad Momi, and Shahin Shikho, along with a number of Peshmerga and the main leader Hama Sur Hussein Barzinji. The primary mission of this group was to attack the Ain Zala police station.

The last group was led by Ali Halo Ali, along with squad leader Abdul Rahman Dino and a number of other Peshmerga. The mission of this group was to control several important institutions within the company, especially the (switchboard and wireless) room, with an alternate force deployed on the hills surrounding the company.

Enemy losses and Peshmerga gains

On the night of October 11-12, 1962, the Peshmerga forces launched the operation according to the previous plan. After a violent clash with the guards and police in the company, they were able to hit their targets, as a number of police were killed and others wounded. The Peshmerga forces were also able to capture 70 policemen and officers, including the company manager (Dick Dancourt) along with two British engineers. 

In the meantime, the Peshmerga burned an oil depot, a telephone switchboard, and eight vehicles belonging to the company. The Peshmerga's gains included 33 rifles, a machine gun, six pistols, two Bren machine guns, two cameras, and a large quantity of medical equipment. The loss of the Peshmerga forces in this epic was the martyrdom of one of the Peshmerga named Shahin Shikho, whose body was later exhumed by the Iraqi forces from the grave and subjected to inhumane insult after being dragged in a military vehicle in Ain Zala.

The echo of this operation 

Due to the importance and echo of the Peshmerga's victory in that operation, Mullah Mustafa Barzani sent a congratulatory telegram to Issa Siwar, after the release of all police personnel and company employees by the Peshmerga forces. The foreign prisoners were sent to his headquarters by orders from President Barzani. When they arrived at his headquarters, Barzani received them himself. They were treated with great respect and all comforts were provided to them. It must be said that during the release of these prisoners and all foreigners, the Kurdish revolution did not demand any material benefits from any party, but they were released for free. 

This means that the Kurdish revolution, under the guidance of the leader of the revolution, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, has always upheld the principles of human rights, humanitarian values, and the laws of war, and has never resorted to torturing prisoners of war or violence. Despite the brutality of the enemy army and the lack of international support for its revolution, the mountains were its friends and they relied on them. 

The Ain Zala operation in the memory of Iraqi Army commanders

Even this major operation was clearly referred to in the writings and memoirs of the Iraqi Army commanders who were enemies of the Kurdish revolution. For example, Brigadier General Saeed Hammo al-Talafari, commander of the Second Battalion of the Eleventh Brigade in the Iraqi Army at the time, testified, writing: "This brave act required high physical strength, because the Peshmerga forces were able to cross the Tigris River twice, and the work was carried out in two nights and one day." As Brigadier General Abdul Karim Farhan, commander of the First Division of the Iraqi Army, wrote, "The Kurdish rebels launched a successful and brave campaign against the oil wells in Ain Zala, northwest of Mosul."

 The goal of the operation

The goal of this operation was to show the Iraqi government that the Peshmerga forces can not only cut through mountainous areas, but can go further and carry out similar mountainous actions in the vast flat plains. On the other hand, the attack on the Ain Zala company had a great echo in international financial circles, and as a result, interest in the Kurdish revolution doubled in international corridors. On the other hand, it damaged the government's reputation for its failure to protect its institutions and intimidated foreign countries that have oil interests in Iraq. One can also speak of another positive aspect of the operation, which is for the reputation of the Kurdish revolution and tarnishing the government's reputation, which is encouraging foreign journalists to visit Kurdistan and conduct research on the Kurdish revolution and the reasons for the Kurdish people's fighting, and delivering the voice of the Kurdish revolution to the world. 

Sources:

1- Abdul Fattah Ali al-Butani, Badinan Region 1925 – 1970, Vol. 2, (Salahaddin University Press - Erbil - 2017).

2- Rojin Chalabi Munir, Zakho July 14, 1958 – March 6, 1975, Zakho Center for Kurdish Studies, (Zakho - 2018).

3- Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Three, Part One, (Ministry of Education Press, 2004).

4- Shawkat Mullah Ismail Hassan, Days in the History of the Aylul Revolution, Second Edition, (Tafsir Office - Erbil - 2006).

5- Saeed Hammo, Memoirs of an Infantry Brigade Commander, Baghdad, 1977.