At the same time, the living situation in the Barzan region became much more difficult, to the point where hunger reached a dangerous level, and by the decision of the central government, they began to increase military bases in the region; this action led to public dissatisfaction, and some of them took refuge in the mountains and fought against the police stations in this region.

The hardships that the Barzanis faced between 1940-1942, the economic and social blockade that the Mutasarrif of Sulaymaniyah had imposed on the Barzanis, and the economic crisis caused by the Second World War and the reasons for the poor economic situation in the Barzan region, led Mustafa Barzani to inform the government to resolve the problems of that region, but that request had no result.

Mustafa Barzani, after a series of contacts that lasted until 1943, realized that the conditions for organizing another revolution were favorable; on one hand, the people no longer had the capacity for all this oppression and injustice that the officials and police stations were committing against them. Therefore, after consulting with the Hiwa Party and a number of patriotic figures, on July 12, 1943, he decided to return to the Barzan region.

Because the internal roads of Iraq were completely under the control and strict surveillance of Iraqi forces, Mustafa Barzani and two of his companions named Mustafa Abdullah Akrayi and Suleiman Sur, with the help of Sheikh Muhammad Chakol, a cousin of Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji, after passing through the Pishdar mountains, went to the village of Turjal in the northwest of Saqqez, and there they contacted Haji Baba Sheikh - the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kurdistan in 1946. Because a reward had been set by the Iraqi government for the capture of Mustafa Barzani and his companions, Barzani agreed, for the sake of his own safety and that of his companions and so that no one would know who he was, to be sent to the Haji Omaran border under the name of one of the sheikhs of Hawraman and with trusted people.

After Mustafa Barzani reached Naghadeh via Sardasht and Mahabad, and from there he went to Aghza Zewa to the house of Mamand Sherwani (Mamand Masih), who was a Barzani himself and had come to Naghadeh due to the Iraqi government, and a place had been provided for him in that village by Kak Mamand Agha Qadri Kulich, one of the Mamash tribal leaders. After Barzani went to Mamand Masih, they went together through the Shno region via Nallos and Babkhala to the village of Kak Mamand Agha Mamash, who was a Kulich, and stayed with him for a while.

One day when Mustafa Barzani, Mamand Agha Mamash, and a number of other figures of the region were sitting in the guest house of Mamand Agha's house, Qarni Agha, one of the aghas of the Piran tribe, visited Mamand Agha and said to him: "The Iraqi police director on the border of the two countries has come to me and told me that Mustafa Barzani has come to Iran, and whoever can hand him over to the Iraqi government alive or dead, will be given a car full of dinars as a reward." This is at a time when Qarni Agha does not know Mustafa Barzani and does not know that he is present in that gathering, and his words cause the anger of Mamand Agha Mamash, but in reality, the amount of money that had been set by the Iraqi government for the alive or dead Mullah Mustafa Barzani was fifty thousand Iraqi dinars, which was officially published in the newspaper (Fatat al-Iraq) in Mosul. After Mustafa Barzani stayed with Mamand Agha Mamash for a while, he was able to form a 30-person force from the Barzanis who had fled from Iraq over several years and had been sheltered by Kak Mamand Agha Mamash in several of his villages, especially in the villages of Kani Rash and Aghza Zewa.

Barzani and his force entered Iraqi territory on 28/7/1943, and after resting at the house of Mahmud Beg Khalifa Samad, he reached the village of Bbel and stayed at the house of someone named Muhammad Mullah, who was one of the elders of the region. Mustafa Barzani went from the village of Bbel to the Mamandan region and was warmly welcomed.

After Barzani returned to the Barzan region, he visited the region and met with the people, and a large number joined Mustafa Barzani's force, such as: Muhammad Saeed Birokhi, Mullah Shini Bedaruni, Aziz Agha Zarari, and Salih Kanyelnji. These visits and meetings continued throughout the months of August and September 1943.

The love for Barzani among the people of Barzan on one hand, and the oppression and injustice that the police and officials of the region had imposed on the people of Barzan on the other, caused the young men and those who were capable of carrying weapons to quickly join Barzani, and within two weeks their number reached 750 people.

After gathering the force, Mustafa Barzani contacted the commander of the Shitna police station, who was a person named Mufawwad Qadir Beg Rawanduzi, in order to have him deliver a letter to the government. In that letter, Mustafa Barzani showed his readiness for the sake of an agreement and finding a peaceful solution. To receive the answer to his letter, he and Qadir Beg set a place near the Mazna of Bradost mountain to receive the written answer within three days, but the Iraqi government sent a force to that designated place to arrest Barzani; in this way, the government's bad intentions were revealed.

When Mustafa Barzani  reached the conviction that the government did not want to solve the Kurdish problem peacefully in any way, on 2/10/1943, a part of Barzani's force, under the supervision of Muhammad Amin Mirkhan, Mamand Masih, and Aziz Agha Zarari, attacked the Shanadar police station and took control of it.

Following those attacks, the Iraqi government sent a police battalion under the command of a police battalion commander named Jawad Beg to Mustafa Barzani, and they were stationed in Shirwan Mazn. This was at a time when Mustafa Barzani had gone to the Kherazok outpost in the village of Kherazok, which belongs to the Piran sub-district in the Mergasor district. In a very short period, 21 police stations, excluding the three police stations of Mergasor, Barzan, and Bile, were controlled, and all the police stations in the Barzan region were taken over. With this action, all the areas of Shirwan Mazn and Mergasor, along with a large amount of weapons and ammunition, fell under Barzani's control. Furthermore, Barzani's successive victories against the Iraqi forces caused the revolution to gain fame, to the extent that the subject became a hot topic in the sessions of the Iraqi Parliament and all political meetings in Iraq, and it took its place as the most important headline in the newspapers.

On October 25, 1943, after the battles of Kherazok and Shanadar, the Mutasarrif of Mosul Liwa sent a letter to Mustafa Barzani through Ahmad Fakhri Beg and Mullah Tahir Effendi, in which he requested that Mustafa Barzani surrender himself so that he could provide a pardon decision for him, and the government was prepared to resolve the problems of the exiled Barzanis.

At that same time, the Hiwa Party, which was a secret Kurdish party in Baghdad whose members consisted of educated classes, officers, soldiers, tribal leaders, and all segments of society, contacted Mustafa Barzani and sent a letter in Baghdad to all foreign embassies in Baghdad stating that the purpose of the Barzani revolution was to establish a decentralized government for the Kurds under the shadow of the Barzan revolution.

All these events together caused fear and anxiety among the British and the Iraqi government, because they feared that the Barzan revolution would expand and cover all of Kurdistan. Therefore, after the letter the Mutasarrif of Mosul sent to Barzani, in the continuation of the same efforts, on November 2, 1943, C.J. Edmonds, who was the advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior at that time, sent a letter to Mustafa Barzani and asked him to accept the government's conditions and hand over himself and his weapons to the government. However, Mustafa Barzani replied to Edmonds' letter on November 6, 1943, in which he rejected the conditions that the Iraqi government had set for negotiations and showed that he did not trust the government's promises, because after the 1931-1932 Barzan uprising and the surrender of the Barzanis, the government had treated them inhumanely.

Something that needs to be mentioned here is that the then-Iraqi government not only used its own army forces and pro-government Kurdish forces to suppress the second Barzan revolution, which had just begun, but also entrusted the leadership of all its military movements to a British general named Promilo, who was known as "Be-Dast" (Handless), but the attacks that were carried out against the Barzanis between 1943 and May 1944 yielded no results other than failure.

When those battles took place between the Iraqi army and the Barzani forces, the British ambassador came to Mustafa Barzani and asked him to end the war. He had also asked the Iraqi government to change its policy towards the Kurds and use a softer policy. For this purpose, a change occurred in the political scene in Iraq in 1943. On 25/12/1943, Nuri al-Said formed a new government once again, which included three Kurdish ministers: Ahmad Mukhtar Baban for the Ministry of Justice, Omar Nazmi for the Ministry of Interior, and Majid Mustafa as Minister of State, who was specifically tasked with resolving the Kurdish issue.

 

After Majid Mustafa was given full authority by the government to resolve the Barzanis' problem, he approached the Hiwa Party and asked the government to send three Kurdish officers as liaison officers to the Barzan region. The government approved this request and announced to the Hiwa Party that they should choose the officers themselves. The Hiwa Party designated Amin Rawanduzi, Izzat Abdulaziz, and Sayyid Aziz Sayyid Abdullah and sent them to Majid Mustafa. After discussions with Majid Mustafa, these officers were sent to Mergasor to talk to Mustafa Barzani, at a time when the Hiwa Party had already informed Barzani that these individuals were members of their party.

When those three Kurdish officers, who belonged to the Hiwa Party and were also government representatives, went to Barzan with Majid Mustafa on 7/1/1944 to talk to Barzani and have him abandon armed activity, Mustafa Barzani presented several demands to that committee to be conveyed to the government, and if they were implemented, he would abandon armed activity. The demands were:

  • Transferring and dismissing those officials who are known for bribery and abuse of their power.
  • Forming the Kurdistan region from the Liwas of (Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, and the Kurdish districts of the Mosul Liwa, which are Zakho, Amadiya, Duhok, Akre, Sheikhan, Sinjar, along with the two districts of Khanaqin and Mandali in the Diyala Liwa).
  • In this Liwa, the Kurdish language shall be the official language.
  • A Kurdish assistant minister shall be appointed for every ministry.
  • Creating a ministry whose minister is Kurdish and to which the affairs of this Kurdistan region are entrusted.
  • Those who have suffered losses shall be compensated.
  • Opening schools and hospitals, paving roads, and developing the region.
  • In the Kurdistan province, military, financial, and foreign affairs shall be the exclusive domain of the central government.
  • Returning the exiles to the region and releasing the detainees.

After Majid Mustafa returned to Baghdad and conveyed Mustafa Barzani's demands to the authorities in Baghdad, the Iraqi Council of Ministers issued this eight-point decision on 25/1/1944 in response to Barzani's demands:

  • A new administration should be established in the districts of Zibar, Rawandiz, Amadiya, and the surroundings of Mergasor, Shirwan Mazn, and Barzan, and good officials should be appointed for it; if possible, those officers should be sent to them as liaison officers.
  • Establishing police posts in all those areas from Khalifan and Rezana to Diana and Kani Rash.
  • Opening roads between the posts.
  • Removing Mustafa Barzani from the Barzan region.
  • Returning Sheikh Ahmed Barzani and the exiled Barzanis to Barzan, and Mustafa Barzani going to Baghdad to surrender, but the decision on these two matters was in the hands of the Minister of Interior or Majid Mustafa, who could decide on it whenever they wished.
  • The things that Mustafa Barzani and his companions had seized from the government, along with their own weapons, should be handed over to the government.
  • The government should agree to a general amnesty for the Barzanis, except for the armed men and those officials who were in the government and then joined the ranks of Mustafa Barzani; also, the government announced that it would publish this amnesty decision whenever it desired.
  • Each ministry should carry out what is its responsibility.

After the issuance of this decision, the government of Iraq selects a number of Kurdish officers of the Iraqi army to go to the Kurdish regions and work there as liaison officers to implement the government's tasks. The names of those officers were:

  1. Colonel Amin Rawandizi for Rawandiz.
  2. General Bahauddin Sheikh Nouri for Sulaymaniyah.
  3. Captain Sayyid Aziz Sayyid Abdullah for Mergasor.
  4. Captain Mirhaj Ahmed for Akre.
  5. Major Izzat Abdulaziz for Blee.
  6. Captain Mustafa Khoshnaw for Barzan.
  7. Captain Majid Ali for Amadiya.
  8. Captain Fuad Arif for Pshdar.

After the issuance of that decision by the Council of Ministers of Iraq, Baghdad, in order to normalize the Situation, implements one of its promises, which was the release of the exiled Barzanis; therefore, Sheikh Ahmed Barzani and the exiled Barzanis return to the Barzan region on 12/2/1944. After performing this act, Mustafa Barzani, along with a number of tribal leaders of the region, visits Baghdad on 22/2/1944, where he meets with the Prime Minister of Iraq and the British Ambassador, and after staying in Baghdad for one week, he returns to Barzan.

Those actions that were carried out during that period, and both sides chose the path of peace, sitting down, and dialogue instead of war and bloodshed, but Britain began to create a number of plans against the Kurds, for example:

  1. Sowing the seeds of discord among Kurdish youth at the hands of hired individuals.
  2. The threats and promises of the British Ambassador to Mustafa Barzani, which were sent via letters.
  3. The resignation of the Nuri al-Said cabinet on (3/6/1944) under the pretext of forming a transitional ministry to create obstacles in the way of implementing the reforms that this cabinet had announced.
  4. The formation of a cabinet by Hamdi al-Pachachi on (3/6/1944) and the arrival of Mustafa al-Omari as Minister of Interior, and among the Kurds, Ahmed Mukhtar Baban was appointed as Minister of Justice and Tawfiq Wahbi as Minister of Economy. During the era of those ministers, the task of the liaison officers was removed and some of them were retired.
  5. Setting aside the decisions of the Nuri al-Said cabinet, which had not yet been implemented, along with the dissolution of his cabinet; this was the pursuit of a specific policy towards the Barzanis.

With the new cabinet coming to power, the policy of opposing the Kurds was pursued once again. For that very purpose, the Ministry of Defense, by a decision, asks the Kurdish officers who had previously been sent as liaison officers to the regions of Kurdistan to return to Baghdad. When those officers return to Baghdad, Mirhaj and Mustafa Khoshnaw see that the situation of the Hiwa Party is in the worst possible state. Therefore, along with Izzat Abdulaziz, they each take a two-month leave, and Mirhaj and Mustafa Khoshnaw go to Mahabad for a meeting with the Komala Zh.K, which at that time had gained much fame in Iran. Izzat Abdulaziz also goes to Syria to establish a connection with the (Khoybun) association. After the return of Mirhaj and Mustafa Khoshnaw, because they were suspicious of the government, Mirhaj goes to Baghdad and Mustafa goes to Barzan so that if there was danger, they would not both be affected.

After one month, Mirhaj notifies Khoshnaw to return to his work, but after one month, both of them are removed from their jobs, and Mirhaj is arrested and sent to the city of Amara. Mustafa Khoshnaw, who was in Mosul at that time, when he learns that an arrest warrant has been issued for him, goes to Betwata. Regarding Izzat Abdulaziz, it must be said that he goes from Syria to Egypt, and when he returns to Baghdad and understands the situation, he immediately leaves Baghdad and reaches Barzan and notifies Mustafa Khoshnaw that he should also go to Barzan.

As a result of the increase in opposition to the Kurds by the Pachachi government, and after it becomes clear to Mustafa Barzani that the Iraqi Parliament and the Hamdi al-Pachachi government are revoking the promises of their previous government, they also take a stance to oppose the government and prepare themselves for this Situation, organize their ranks, and contact prominent Kurds in Baghdad, Kirkuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Mosul, and Rawandiz. On the other hand, they spread their demands among the ranks of Kurdish soldiers and officers of the Iraqi army and asked them to join the ranks of the revolution. Furthermore, the leadership of the revolution contacted the progressive political parties and groups of Iraq, clarified the demands of the Kurdish people to the Arabs, and rejected the propaganda of the Arabs who were saying that the Kurds support the Soviets and want to spread the ideology of Communism and Russian power in Iraq.

After the government of Hamdi al-Pachachi demanded that the officers return to Baghdad, and also after the arrest of Mirhajj, in the second half of 1944, Barzani tried very hard to ensure that war did not break out between his forces and the Iraq army, but the government had not taken any positive steps in any way. Therefore, together with a number of Kurdish officers in Barzan, who were: Mustafa Khoshnaw, Izzat Abdulaziz, Abdulhamid Baqir, Muhammad Mahmud, Shawkat Nu'man, Ahmad Ismail, Bakr Abdulkarim, and Hafizullah Ismail. These officers, except for Muhammad Mahmud, on 15/1/1945, established a committee called the (Freedom Committee), which was headed by Mustafa Barzani, and they issued a statement in which they pointed out their programs, which were:

  1. Liberation of Kurdistan and freeing it from oppression and tyranny.
  2. Formation of an armed group to protect Kurdistan.
  3. Striving for general national peace.
  4. Establishing fraternal relations with all national and freedom-loving parties and organizations in all parts of Kurdistan.
  5. Conveying the voice of the Kurds and those oppressed to all world public opinion and countries through the embassies of the countries in Baghdad.
  6. Exposing the enemy's policy towards the Kurdish people among the strata of the people through media outlets, and demanding that it implement the articles of the 1943 agreement that stopped the war.

After the establishment of the Freedom Committee by Barzani and the Kurdish officers affiliated with the Hiwa Party, on 30/1/1945, Rafiq Hilmi, the head of the Hiwa Party, asked Barzani for both sides to reunite and for the headquarters of the Hiwa Party in Baghdad to move to Barzan. However, Barzani, in response to this request, stated that he did not consider it appropriate at that time for the Hiwa base to be moved from Baghdad to Barzan, but rather it was better for one person to be made responsible for communications in each city. In early March 1945, Mustafa Barzani was informed by the Hiwa Party that the Iraq army wanted, under the pretext of military training, from 5/3/1945 to 14/3/1945, to take control of strategic and important locations, such as Mount Qandil and Bradost. Therefore, Mustafa Barzani, by distributing his forces across the Mergasor, Bradost, and western Akre fronts, prepared themselves to fight the Iraq army. When Britain learned of this, it sent its embassy's political advisor in Baghdad, named (Captain Stokes), to the Barzan region, and they met in the village of Shawraw. In the meeting, Stokes discussed that because the Iraq army forces were unskilled in fighting, the British force had decided that in order for them to learn new fighting methods, a maneuver and training would be organized for them, and there was no danger to the Kurds of Barzani and their region.

The diplomatic efforts of Barzani and the Iraq government continued throughout the months of March and April 1945. One of the parties to these discussions, which considered itself the owner of the issue, as was discussed before, out of fear for its own interests, we see the ambassador of that country, named Kinahan Cornwallis, writing a letter to Mustafa Barzani in May 1945, in which he asks him to give up fighting. In that letter, he wrote to Barzani:

((As you know, I have been busy with your affairs for a long time, and you still have a problem... I know that you want more to be done for your people. That matter is well known in Baghdad, and your British and Iraqi friends are always trying to help you, but you must know that the first step must be taken by you, and that should not be in the form of threatening to cause chaos. That kind of step does not make anyone happy, neither the British nor the Iraqis, and it will lead them to the conclusion that you are someone who wants to disturb the peace and waste their time.)) In addition to that letter from the British ambassador, on 2/4/1945, a letter from the commander of the Rawanduz battalion reached Barzani, stating that the British political advisor in Mosul, named Major Moore, wanted to meet with Mustafa Barzani, Sheikh Ahmad Barzani, and the officers on 5/4/1945 in the Blee region. However, when the Barzanis went to Blee at the appointed time, Major Moore was not present.

Once again, on 20/4/1945, a letter was given to Mustafa Barzani by the Mutasarrif of Erbil, stating that Major Moore wanted to meet with Izzat Abdulaziz in Harir. Therefore, Izzat Abdulaziz and Muhammad Mahmud went to Harir, but this time, by the time they arrived, Major Moore had returned. Finally, on 25/4/1945, Major Moore and Izzat Abdulaziz and Muhammad Mahmud Qudsi went to Barzan, and Moore met with Sheikh Ahmad Barzani and said: "The British ambassador in Baghdad requests that we carry out the orders of the Iraq government, hand over their weapons, and busy ourselves with agriculture." Sheikh Ahmad replied: "When weapons are taken back from our neighboring Assyrians and other tribes, we are also ready to lay down our weapons." And in this way, this meeting also ended without results.

The political situation in Iraq in 1945 had witnessed a very high level of complexity, a complexity that reached a point where, on 7/5/1945, by the decision of Sheikh Ahmed Barzani, his representative Mamand Masih, after his meeting with the Russians, brought two Russian officers named Abdullah Tipo and Voqasov, who were wearing Kurdish clothes, with him to the Barzan region. It is worth mentioning that these two officers were among those Azerbaijanis who knew Kurdish well. These two officers had promised Mustafa Barzani and Sheikh Ahmed Barzani that if a war with Baghdad started, they would help the Kurds in all fields. It was also decided to coordinate with the (Zh-K) society and to set up routes through Dashti Hert - Mergasor for the passage of aid. It was also agreed that if the Barzanis were defeated, they could retreat towards Iran. After some time, Mustafa Barzani met with General Siamandov of the Soviet Army.

After Barzani's visit to the military commanders of the Soviet Union and their support for the Kurdish liberation movement, Britain and the Iraqi government were very displeased. The British political advisor in Mosul, known as (Mead), warned Barzani by letter to change his behavior and stop armed actions. In addition, the Iraqi government tasked Minister of Defense Ismail Namiq to prepare forces to attack Barzan. In the meantime, the British General named Renton, who was the head of the British force in Iraq and was known as the (Desert Fox) and was an expert in warfare and had participated in the battles of North Africa in the Second World War, entered the matter, and the Iraqi army moved on land and in the air according to his plan.

When Barzani saw that the Baghdad government had not taken any steps to resolve the problems and instead of fulfilling the promises it had made in previous negotiations, it began to oppose the Barzanis and kill the personalities of that tribe and kill people such as (Wali Beg), who was the chief of the Shirwani tribe, and because of their warplanes, they bombed their villages and destroyed their agricultural fields. Therefore, he wrote a letter to all the embassies of the countries that were in Baghdad and informed them of Baghdad's actions against the Barzanis and asked the embassies of foreign countries to help the Kurds in this problem, so that war would not break out again, and he again asked to sit with the Prime Minister of Iraq and resolve the problem in this way, but none of these actions had any result.

After the futility of those efforts by Barzani to prevent the start of a war between the central government and the Barzanis, the Iraqi government prepared itself to start the war. For this purpose, 30,000 soldiers, 12,000 police, and a large number of armed men from tribes supporting the government gathered together to attack the Barzanis from several sides that they had previously determined. The places that were determined for the attack were Zakho, Amadiya, Akre, and Rawanduz. On the other hand, because the Barzanis were very skilled fighters on the ground and the Barzan region was a mountainous and rugged area, and fighting in it was difficult for the soldiers of the Iraqi government, the Iraqi Air Force gathered all its fighter jets at the airports of Erbil and Mosul.

When Mustafa Barzani and his force became aware of this action, they created a defensive line to protect themselves from the enemy's attack. For this purpose, Mustafa Barzani himself took responsibility for the Akre front and arrived at that place on 21/8/1945. After that, on 24/8/1945, Mahmoud Agha Zebari and his men joined Barzani, and they were able to control Pires Mountain. The number of Peshmerga at that time reached about five thousand fighters, of whom three thousand were Barzanis and the others were from Kurdish tribes who had joined the revolution. The eastern line was also under the command of Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq and with the help of Izzat Abdulaziz, where the war started on that line on 25/8/1945, and Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq was seriously wounded by artillery fire. The western defensive line - Balinda - was also under the command of Salih Abdulaziz, the brother of Izzat Abdulaziz.

Because the Iraqi force could more easily carry out a ground attack on the mountainous regions of Barzan, they decided that first, with the help of the Iraqi Air Force and the British Air Force known as (R.A.F), they would bomb the Barzan region. In addition, because this revolution needed to be supported by a superpower and for the Kurds to be armed in terms of material and also fighting, Mustafa Barzani wrote a letter to Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union, in which he asked him to provide material and armed aid to the Kurds and for the Kurdish revolution to be recognized as a sacred national revolution. In return, the Kurds were ready to be under the help of Russia and would be in readiness with Russia in political, economic, cultural, agricultural, and military relations, so that Russia would be a helper to the Kurds in foreign policy.

After both sides prepared themselves to start the war, at the beginning of August 1945, the Iraqi government decided to attack the Kurdish regions under the control of the Barzanis. However, General Renton, who was the head of the British military mission in Iraq, asked the Iraqi government not to start the attack yet because the roads were not ready, as the Iraqi army did not have such preparation yet. But when Baghdad did not listen to his words, he left his command centers in Erbil and withdrew his advisors who had been prepared in the Iraqi army for fighting.

With the start of the battles of the Iraqi army, which began in August 1945 against the Barzanis, and with full force, as well as by utilizing a number of Kurdish tribes supporting the government—who, for money and promises of receiving ranks and positions from the central government, acted against the Barzanis—because the forces lacked experience in fighting in the mountainous and rugged areas of Barzan, and contrary to them, the Barzanis had complete experience in mountain and guerrilla warfare, the Iraqi army suffered heavy losses and damages. This caused astonishment among Iraqi and British officials: how could a force that is weaker than the Iraqi army both in terms of combat equipment and personnel, during fighting, be able to fight in such a way that with minimal personnel and losses to itself, it inflicts major losses on the Iraqi army? Especially after the Nehla battle between Akre Mountain and Pires Mountain, which took place on 8/9/1945, and Mustafa Barzani's force was able to defeat the Fifth Regiment of the Iraqi army, and until the Kurdish tribal forces of the area came to help that regiment, the Iraqi army could not be saved in Nehla.

Because the Iraqi force could not achieve victory in the war against the Barzanis in the mountainous and rugged areas, Britain could not restrain itself, and contrary to the time when General Renton had initially withdrawn all British military advisors from the front lines, it was forced to resolve this matter. Therefore, without regard for the sovereignty of Iraqi territory, it intervened in an internal issue, and for this purpose, it first appointed a new ambassador to Iraq instead of Cornwallis. After that, it began creating propaganda that the leaders of the Barzani revolution were supporters of communism and supporters of Moscow. In the next phase of their activities, they were able to attract a number of Kurdish tribal chiefs in the area, such as: Sheikh Rashid of Lolan, Rashid Beg of Bradost, Ahmed Agha and Mahmoud Agha of Zebari, a part of the Surchi tribe, and Kalhe Agha of Rekani, to their side in order to stand against the Kurdish people's revolution. Also, the British government, which feared that the oil fields of Mosul and Kirkuk would fall into the hands of the Kurds and thus be in danger, presented 31 fighter jets to the Iraqi army and participated in suppressing that revolution.

As mentioned, after the Iraqi force could not achieve victory over the Barzanis through ground attacks, it utilized air attacks, which were by its own planes and British fighter jets, and in those attacks, it did not observe the international laws of warfare in any way and heavily targeted the villages, hamlets, and agricultural fields of the Barzan region. Those attacks were such that every day 14 planes would attack the area 8 or 10 times. As a result of those bombardments, 50 residential locations in the area were destroyed, and five residential locations were completely wiped off the map. However, in these battles, the Barzani force was generally able to shoot down 9 enemy planes.

At the end of September 1945, when Mustafa Barzani issued the decision to retreat towards Eastern Kurdistan, because after seeing the behavior of the Kurdish tribes in reneging on the promises they had made to the revolution and their joining the government, fighting against a government supported by a superpower like Britain became an impossible task. Therefore, by relying on the agreement he had previously made with the Soviet Union and also the cooperation of the (Zh-K) Society, when they no longer had the ability to defend, the borders of Eastern Kurdistan were opened to them. Therefore, at the end of September of the same year, the Barzanis, according to a pre-planned map, began to withdraw towards Eastern Kurdistan. That decision for the Barzanis to retreat towards Eastern Kurdistan was made after Mustafa Barzani met with the Freedom Committee and Sheikh Ahmed Barzani, and they agreed on that decision and a precise plan was set so that the Barzanis could save themselves from this bad and unfavorable situation with minimal losses, and after all the Barzanis and their families gathered in Kani Rash, they would enter Iranian territory. This plan was as follows: ((1- A full force should go towards Kani Rash on the Iranian border to protect the Khwakurk valley road and not let the Bradostis block their way, and the Rawanduz front force should form a strong defensive line from Qalander to Pires Mountain and prevent the enemy from advancing. 2- A force should also go to the Biaw valley to protect the rear of the families and not let the Surchi mercenaries follow them. 3- The Balinda force should withdraw to Shirin Mountain and the lower country area and protect the remaining families of those villages from the mercenaries and Rekanis. 4- Protect the Pires-Ble road and not let the Zebari mercenaries take it.))

The departure of the Barzanis to Iranian Kurdistan was not easy; it had many difficulties, the most important of which were the battles that the Barzan force was forced to fight against the Iraq army and the Jash (pro-government Kurdish militias) on one hand, and the protection of their families and forces from the bombing of British and Iraq aircraft on the other. For this very reason, on 26/9/1945, the Iraq government, with the help of the Bradost Jash, advanced towards the Bradost and Qalandar mountains on the Rawanduz front. However, the Barzanis were able to resist and pushed the Bradost forces from Qalandar Mountain to the Diana camp, and a large number of Bradost were killed. On the Akre front, the Surchi stood as government Jash against the Barzanis, and the government and Kurdish forces against Barzani were trying to capture Pires Mountain, but they could not due to the resistance of the Barzanis. Later, on 30/9/1945, that mountain was evacuated, but they encountered battles with the Surchi on the way. Mustafa Barzani returned to Barzan on 2/10/1945 and from there went to Kani Rash. Then, on 11/10/1945, via Keleshin, Barzani and his force, their families, and the Kurdish officers entered the territory of Iranian Kurdistan.

Sources:
  • Mansur Sheikh Rauf Barzinji, Some Historical Facts About the Revolution of Sheikh Abdul-Salam Barzani and Other Barzan Revolutions until 1945, Erbil, 2001.
  • Roz Abdullah Adil Argoshi, The Barzan Region Between the Years (1931-1946), Master's Thesis, Salahaddin University, Erbil, 2010.
  • Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement (1931-1958), Volume One.
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  • Hussein Huzni Mukriyani, Historical Events in Kurdistan, Erbil, Aras Publishing and Distribution House, 1999.
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