The Battle of Mount Matin was one of the series of battles of the Aylul Revolution  on Mount Matin, which is located near the Amadiya district in the year 1963, and took place between the Peshmerga Forces of Kurdistan and the Iraqi government.

Pre-battle conditions

After the Ba'athist coup in February 8 of 1963, for a period the Kurdish revolution, led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani declared a ceasefire, but when their authority was established and their position became strong, they turned against the Kurds and their revolution with fire and iron. On June 10, 1963, the Iraqi government declared war against the Kurdish people, and President Abdul Salam Arif was insistent on placing all the country's economic resources under the command of the army with the aim of destroying the Kurdish revolution. In a series of attacks and assaults with its large military logistical capabilities, through the scouting and cooperation of the Jash (collaborators), and also with external and regional support, especially after the tripartite agreement between (Iraq, Syria, and Egypt) which was concluded on April 17, 1963, for political unity between the three countries, a military union between Syria and Iraq came into being. On September 8, 1963, the Syrian army participated for the first time alongside the Iraqi army in the war against Kurdistan. The Syrian Yarmouk Force, led by Colonel Fahd al-Sha'ir, entered Iraqi territory; this force consisted of a brigade of approximately 4000 soldiers. In addition to this army, Algerian guerrilla warfare experts and Yemeni pilots also participated in the war. Furthermore, air force experts from India and Pakistan carried out aerial surveying to create new contour maps and identify ravines, valleys, mountain peaks, and village locations. Also, Western countries such as Britain, Spain, the United States of America, and Germany, Arab countries such as Egypt, and Islamic countries such as Pakistan and others, side by side with the Iraqi government, provided assistance and weapons to Iraq.

       

 Peshmerga preparations

The leadership of the Kurdish revolution across all of Kurdistan began preparing to confront the government's aggression and new developments, and had divided the battlefronts into 11 regions, with a leader designated for each region. For the entire Badinan area, As'ad Khoshawi was appointed as commander-in-chief, Issa Siwar as commander of the Zakho area, for the Akre and Sheikhan areas Hasso Mirkan Dolamari, and the Duhok area was entrusted to Ali Khalil Sipri.

 This attack on Mount Matin came after the government army and forces had for some time faced fierce resistance from the revolutionaries on Mount Pires and the Barzan area, where they were able to be victorious and take control of the area. In this way, the government did not end its plan and continued its attacks with its army and mercenaries, heading towards the Amadiya area.

 Plan and aims of the enemy army

The government had two goals in that fierce attack: first, to take control of and destroy the base and headquarters of the First Army, which was under the command of As'ad Khoshawi and whose headquarters was in the village of Adne in the Upper Barwari area. Second, to besiege the Peshmerga forces in Zakho and Duhok. For this purpose, the Iraqi government prepared for the attack from four fronts: the first front from (Bamarni Airport – Mount Matin – west of the Upper Barwari area). The second front from (Sari Bamarni Airport), which was considered the strongest front, with the aim of reaching the villages of Dargel and Aradna, which was the closest route to reach the village of Adne. The third front was from (Sarsing – Aradna – Navila village – Mount Matin – Shilaza village). The last front, which was the fourth front, was from (Amadiya – Sari Amadiya and Charchali – Kani Masi sub-district). In addition to the large and numerous government army, supported by a large number of Jash from the Doski, Zebari, Sharafani, Rekani, Bamarni, Yazidi, and Assyrian tribes, they were divided among the three fronts, which were mostly directed at the Bamarni sub-district, while at the same time the Brifkani, Surchi, Herki, and Goran Jash were taken to Amadiya.

The Iraqi government forces, with the help of part of the Syrian army that we mentioned earlier, advanced towards Mount Matin in August 20, 1963, as Matin is the key to the Badinan region of Kurdistan.

 On the first front, the government forces reached the villages of Dehe, Banka, and Arze, but they could not reach Mount Matin due to the resistance of the Peshmerga. On the second front, after two weeks of fighting, they were able to reach the village of Dargeli after suffering heavy casualties. On the third front, they reached the village of Shilaza, and on the fourth front, they reached the top of Amadiya. On the first and fourth fronts, the attacking forces could not advance further in the Upper Barwari area, while on the second and third fronts, they reached the heights of Gabnerk, which is located in the middle of the Upper Barwari area between the villages of Ravina and Ashe.

In that major campaign, the Iraqi army initially did not expect fierce resistance from the revolutionaries, so in the first campaign, they began the attack without using aircraft and artillery. However, the Peshmerga forces fought a hot battle and put up fierce resistance from dawn until noon, and a large number of soldiers and Jash were killed. After that unexpected defeat, they began their second campaign with intense bombardment, and all the Peshmerga positions were hit by the bombardment. Along with the shelling, on the evening of the same day, they used banned bombs (acid napalm) via aircraft. As a result, a Peshmerga named Yusuf Mahmoud Pendroy had part of his body burned. After that intense bombardment, the army and Jash launched an attack with their large military capabilities. At the same time, despite the unequal force between the two sides, the Peshmerga forces were forced to retreat from the village of Bamarni, and the next day the village was burned.

 The fighting in that area lasted 45 days, and the Peshmerga put up a heroic, non-stop defense. In the end, the government forces were able to occupy Mount Matin, which caused chaos in the area and the people were filled with great fear. The Turkish government, in order to monitor its border, went on high alert, lest the Kurdish families flee to the other side of the border for fear of the Iraqi army. It is worth noting that there was prior coordination between Iraq and Turkey with the aim of striking the Kurdish revolutionaries.

It is worth noting that both the Iraqi and Syrian armies treated the people of the region poorly during the battle, and they would burn and loot every village they passed through. The Syrian forces, in particular, forced the inhabitants of the villages to burn their own villages, which created a reaction among the people of most villages, forcing them to leave their villages and head towards the liberated areas under the authority of the revolution.

After Mount Matin was occupied, a meeting was held between the leaders of the Peshmerga forces, and it was decided in the meeting to reorganize and gather their forces to launch a general attack to liberate Mount Matin, regardless of the number of sacrifices required. Thus, 400 self-sacrificing Peshmerga swore that even if it meant their own death, they must cleanse Matin of the enemy. On the night of 4 to 5 of October 1963, Commander Issa Suwar and his assistant Ali Halo gave the order to start the campaign. A fierce and difficult battle then took place between the two sides. The battle lasted until dawn, and the result was the complete defeat of the Iraqi forces and the liberation of Mount Matin. It is worth noting that before the start of the attack, the field commander of the battle, Issa Suwar, sent a message that had fallen into the hands of the Iraqi army. The message stated: "Tonight, 1000 fighters from the Qushuri tribe of Northern Kurdistan will start the attack. We have informed them that the heads are for us and the property is for them. We are also 1000 Peshmerga, and we will become 2000 Peshmerga." With this, the army and the Jash were struck with low morale and confusion. Clearly, this message was a war tactic used by the aforementioned commander, and it became a support for victory and the collapse of the enemy.

The recording of that great epic was under the command and supervision of Asaad Khoshawi, Issa Suwar, and Ali Khalil Silki, and with the participation of several squad leaders and prominent Peshmerga, including Haji Haidar Argushi, Suleiman Haji Badriya, Saeed Khalil Silki, Taymaz Silki, Hashim Merozi, Mikail Salam Argushi, Sayyid Salih, Aref Darwish, Hamid Argushi, Nazmi Shukri, Ali Salih Mawati, Salim Mullah Yahya, Khalid Dezoyi, Jamila Sor, Hashim Tahir Argushi, Taha Shahin Mawati, and many others. It must also be noted that the casualties of the Peshmerga forces were recorded as the martyrdom of 37 Peshmerga and the wounding of 80 Peshmerga, including Jamil Tofiq Bamarni, known as Jamila Sor, Mullah Anwar Mai, Muhammad Rashid Sindi, Muhammad Issa Suwar Silki, Ismail Nerwayi, Jawhar Silki, Mustafa Silki, Baqi Ahmad Suleiman Merozi, Haji Issa Merozi, Hussein Kisteyi, and many others.

The enemy's casualties were recorded as leaving behind the bodies of 113 killed, among whom were Syrian soldiers. Regarding the gains of the Kurdish revolution, there were two mountain cannons of 75 mm caliber, along with 400 rifles and 15 machine guns, along with ammunition and a lot of military equipment.

The result of the success of this epic led to an increase in the morale of the Peshmerga on all battle fronts, and that mountain remained in the hands of the Peshmerga until the year 1974.

Sources:

1- Shirzad Zakaria Muhammad, The Kurdish National Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan 8 February 1963 – 17 July 1968, Dar Spirez for Printing and Publishing, Duhok, 2006, p. 147.

2- Rojin Chalabi Munir, Zakho 14 of July 1958 – 6 of March 1975, Zakho Center for Kurdish Studies, Zakho, 2018, p. 212 – 213.

3- Shawkat Mullah Ismail Hassan, Days in the History of the September Revolution, Second Edition, Tafsir Office, Erbil, 2006, p. 168.

4- Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Three, Part One, Ministry of Education Press, 2004, p. 116.

5- Hozhin Masoud Sarni, The September Revolution in the Bahdinan Region 1961 – 1975, Zakho Center for Kurdish Studies, 2018, p. 118.

6- Rajab Jamil Habib, Amadiya (Al-Amadiya) 1921 – 1975, Hawar Press, Duhok, 2012, p. 260.

7- Archive of the Kurdistan Democratic Party Encyclopedia Committee.

8- Dr. Abdul Fattah Ali Al-Butani, Badinan Region 1925 – 1970 A Study in Political Events and Developments, Part 2, Salahaddin University Press, Erbil, p. 223.