After the coup of July 17 and 30, 1968, and the return of the Baathists to power, a situation of no-war and no-peace prevailed for a time with the government forces in Kurdistan, but clashes continued with the militants of the old Political Bureau, and there were intermittent secondary battles between the army and the revolution forces. However, on November 10, 1968, the Baathist regime, in coordination with the militants of the old Political Bureau wing, attacked all areas under the control of the revolution, and it made great progress in these attacks until December 1969, and seized many cities and towns.

The Qardagh area was one of the areas that was attacked by these forces, and as a result of the intervention and betrayal of the commanders of two battalions, namely Jafar Barzinji and Kamil Mullah Wais, as they handed over their areas to the mercenary militants. Here we refer to one of the battles on a mountain peak called Halaj and the Great Daban, which was controlled by government forces and mercenaries, and the Kurdistan Peshmerga was very interested in controlling it. It is worth noting that the Peshmerga attack and the seizure of the summit of this mountain was done under the direct supervision of Idris Barzani. This was at a time when the government forces and the old Political Bureau group were able to control a large area from Garmian to Mount Halaj and Daban in Qardagh, and it is clear that given the importance of the area, the revolution leadership decided that it was necessary to liberate these areas and return them to the control of the revolution.

After several meetings between the military commanders in the area on how to attack these places and after the leader of the revolution was informed Mustafa Barzani about the Situation, Barzani tasked Idris Barzani to supervise the fighting himself. After he gathered his forces and developed a comprehensive plan to attack the summit of Halaj and Daban, he decided that the mountain summit must fall as soon as possible under the control of the Peshmerga. After the attack on the mountain summit, it was controlled within an hour and 45 minutes and returned to the control of the Peshmerga.

Then the revolution leadership decided to launch a wide attack on Qardagh and other places in order to expel the government forces and mercenaries from them completely. To achieve this goal, the Fourth and Ninth battalions were tasked with attacking from Barzinja to the Sharazor plain and advancing from there to Qardagh. A force from the Erbil plain and a Rizgari force attacked from two fronts with the Fifth Battalion of the Qardagh force. One force to the Qadir Karam and Sangaw area and the other force to the Bazian and Qardagh area. During this period, Lieutenant Tahir Ali Wali Beg was the commander of the Fourth Battalion of the Qardagh forces, while Aziz Qazi was the commander of the Ninth Battalion. 

To start the attack, it was decided that from November 29 to 30, 1969, all forces would attack all the places indicated below at the same time. As planned, the Peshmerga attack began and made great progress. A great victory was recorded, and they were able to liberate all areas of Qardagh, Bazian, Sangaw, Qadir Karam, Tuz Khurmatu, Kifri, Kalar, Bawnoor, and Darbandikhan from the government forces and the militants of the old political wing, and they returned to the control of the Peshmerga. After a major defeat for the government forces and the mercenary militants, they incurred heavy losses and a large quantity of weapons and ammunition were seized. The government forces and the militants collapsed completely and their morale deteriorated to the point that they were no longer able to fight the Peshmerga forces.

The revolution leadership interpreted this victory of the Peshmerga forces as an important and decisive victory at that moment, and therefore the leader of the revolution, Barzani, thanked all the forces that participated in the war. This was a test on the part of the new Baath regime with the help of the old Political Bureau forces, to see the extent of its ability to overcome the Kurdistan revolution and achieve its old dream of the complete collapse of the Kurdish revolution, but its attempt failed and did not achieve its goal.

Sources:

1- Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Three, Part One, Aylul Revolution 1961-1975, (Ministry of Culture Press - First Edition - Erbil - 2004).

2- Ibrahim Jalal, Southern Kurdistan and the Aylul Revolution, Building and Collapse 1961-1975, Fourth Edition, (2021).

3- Karwan Jawhar Muhammad, Idris Barzani 1944-1987, Life and Political and Military Role in the Kurdish Liberation Movement, (Hevi Press - Erbil - 2019).

4- Khoshawi Ali Kanyelnji, Memoirs of Aziz Qazi Hamad Surchi, (Danishfar Press - Erbil - 2023).

5- Hawkar Karim Hama Sharif, Aylul Revolution, First Edition, (Salahaddin University Press - Erbil - 2012).

6- Ari Karim, Several Living Pages from the Aylul Revolution, (Khabat Press - Duhok - 1999).